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Abstract 
During the 1980s and early half of the 1990s, the entry of new firms, the strengthening of 
managerial incentives, and the accumulation of non-state assets in the state sector set the 
stage for China’s shareholding experiment, involving the formal conversion of thousands 
of state-owned enterprises to joint stock companies.  Shareholding conversions have also 
been extensively employed in China’s collective-owned enterprises.  This paper 
examines the impact of the conversion of these state- and collective-owned enterprises on 
a range of measures relating to both equity and efficiency.  The analysis distinguishes 
between the direct effects of conversion holding the asset structure fixed and the induced 
effect, which involves reductions in the proportion of state-owned assets.  For SOEs and 
COEs, conversion contributes to overall increases in both current productivity and 
innovation.  At least during 1995-2001, the period spanned by this study, by encouraging 
employment growth or slowing layoffs, conversion seems to have benefited incumbent 
workers.  Among SOEs, the most robust impact of conversion is the reallocation of 
resources and effort to R&D and new product development, which suggests greater 
attention to deep restructuring.  Conversion greatly enhances the ability of converted 
firms to attract new investment from outside the state sector.  Within the sample used in 
this paper, the state typically retains its assets after conversion: an indication that state 
asset sales or stripping is not widespread. The shareholding experiment seems to be 
creating a channel, in addition to those served by new domestic private enterprise and 
foreign-owned firms, for the emergence of a domestic managerial and entrepreneurial 
class.  Due to these efficiency effects, the greater concentration of conversion in 
wealthier coastal areas is likely to contribute to regional inequality in China.   1 
1.  Introduction 
 
The formal ownership structure of China’s enterprise system has changed 
dramatically over the past two decades.  In 1980, the universe of China’s industrial 
enterprises consisted almost exclusively of state- and collective-owned enterprises (see 
Table 1).  Although during the subsequent decade and a half the numbers of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and collective-owned enterprises (COEs) both rose, by 1995, as 
shown in Table 1, they were outnumbered by the infusion of newly created enterprises.  
These included over 29,000 foreign and overseas firms, a proliferation of shareholding 
enterprises, and nearly 4,000 private companies.  In terms of sheer numbers, the eight 
million individually-owned enterprises with eight or fewer employees added a dimension 
to China’s industrial enterprise sector that could not have been anticipated in 1980.   
Beginning in 1998, China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) revised its formal 
statistical system to include full coverage of only those firms reporting more than five 
million yuan in sales per year.
2  Table 1 shows that in 2001, among these 171,256 larger 
enterprises, more than three-quarters operated outside the state sector.
3   The 36,000 
private sector firms with sales in excess of five million yuan exceeded the number of   
collectives and were approaching the number of surviving state-owned enterprises.  In 
that year, the 46,767 reporting state-owned enterprises represented a precipitous decline 
from the number recorded in 1997.  Many of the disappearing SOEs had been converted 
to shareholding enterprises, so that by 2001, the number of shareholding enterprises had 
grown to nearly 25,000, more than double the figure reported just three years earlier.  
                                                           
2 The scope of enterprises enjoying full coverage includes all state-owned enterprises, regardless of annual 
sales. 
3 In the year 2000, these larger enterprises (with sales in excess of 5 million) accounted for approximately 
56% of China’s total reported industrial output. NBS, 2001, pp. 416, p. 49. 2 
Indeed, during the latter half of the 1990s and continuing to the present, the conversion of 
former state- and collective-owned enterprises to shareholding enterprises has served as 
the principal mode of enterprise restructuring in China.  These conversions constitute the 
focus of our study.  
While most studies of ownership reform focus narrowly on productivity and 
profitability, this study investigates the effect of ownership reform and conversion on a 
broad set of performance measures.  In addition to the conventional measures of labor 
and capital productivity and profitability, we also examine the impact of conversion on 
employment and wages, taxes, and two dynamic measures of enterprise performance, 
namely R&D expenditures and new product sales.  From our statistical exercise, we infer 
the distributive impact of shareholder reform on key stakeholders in the reform process. 
The impact of conversion on performance may operate through multiple channels.  
In this paper, we explicitly distinguish between two channels of impact of the conversion 
process.  The first of these is the direct impact of conversion on enterprise performance, 
holding constant the firm’s asset mix.   The second channel through which conversion 
affects firm performance is the induced effect, which results from the ability of converted 
firms to attract new investment from outside the state sector.  We will document the 
range of impacts of non-state investment on firm performance for firms that have been 
formally converted as well as those that remain unconverted.   
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides an overview of 
ownership reform in China.  Section 3 presents a literature review, which reviews the 
growing body of research on enterprise conversion in China and lessons that might be 
drawn from related research on Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent 3 
States (CIS).   The data set of large and medium-size enterprises that we use in this paper 
is described in Section 4.  In Section 5, so that we might anticipate the direction of the 
performance effect of enterprise conversion, we estimate differences in performance 
across established ownership categories.  Section 6 delineates the samples that we use for 
our estimation work.  We also test for sample selection bias.  Section 7 outlines our 
research methodology, while Section 8 summarizes the estimation results.  Section 9 
computes the total impact of conversion on our performance measures.  An overview of 
the distributional implications of our findings is summarized in Section 10, the 
conclusion.  
 
2.  Ownership Reform in China 
The reform of China’s enterprise system has spanned four related processes.  The 
first is the entry of large numbers of new non-state enterprises.  The second is the reform 
of incentive structures within established systems of public ownership, such as 
strengthening managerial incentives through the contract responsibility system.  The third 
avenue of enterprise reform has been the change in asset structures resulting from the 
accumulation of non-state investment in the state sector.  The last, definitive form of 
ownership change – the outright conversion of enterprises, usually from state or 
collective ownership to some other formal ownership classification – we argue, can be 
viewed as the outcome of the three preceding reform processes.    
  New entry.  Until the mid-1990s the most dramatic avenue of ownership reform in 
Chinese industry was the entry of new firms.  These firms entered China’s enterprise 
sector through three avenues.  The first was the proliferation of collectives, principally, 4 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) during the 1980s.
4  Individually owned 
enterprises (getihu) – enterprises with eight or fewer employees – whose numbers 
ballooned into the millions by 1994 constituted a second source of domestic entry.  
Finally, the third major source of new enterprise formation has been foreign investment, 
both from investors in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao (HKT) and from foreign sources, 
primarily OECD and Southeast Asian countries (FOR).   The importance of new entry is 
underscored by Table 1, which shows that relative to 1980, by 1994 the number of 
industrial enterprises in China had multiplied by a factor of approximately 25.  An 
important consequence of this rapid entry of both domestic and foreign investment was 
the creation of intense competition in many sectors.  By causing a secular decline in 
profitability across all ownership types, the erosion of monopoly rents in state industry 
motivated throughout Chinese industry search for technical innovations and new 
mechanisms of governance.
5 
Reform of control rights.   The introduction of the enterprise contract 
responsibility system in the mid-1980s was intended to strengthen and clarify the system 
of incentives and rewards for SOE managers and workers.  Jefferson, Zhang, and Zhao 
(1999) and Jefferson, Lu, and Zhao (1999) document the vertical reassignment of control 
rights from government supervisory agencies to enterprises and within enterprises the 
horizontal allocation of managerial control rights among managers, workers’ councils, 
and party secretaries.   
The restructuring of state-owned enterprises without formal ownership conversion 
met with limited success.  McMillan and Naughton (1992) find that managers responded 
                                                           
4 Subsequent to the conversion of commune enterprises to TVEs in the early 1980s, in an effort to build on 
their success, many townships and villages established new TVEs. 5 
to expanded autonomy, including greater profit retention, by strengthening worker 
discipline, increasing the proportion of workers’ income paid in the form of bonuses, and 
raising the fraction of workers on fixed term contracts. However, while most studies 
document efficiency gains in the state sector, productivity growth in state industry has 
generally lagged behind that outside the state sector.
6  From the long-run perspective of 
ownership reform in China, the important outcome of the strengthening of managerial 
control rights is that a managerial class emerged as a group bearing strong vested interest 
in privatization. 
Changing asset structure.  One might expect a substantial association between 
formal ownership classification and the ownership structure of the assets.  In China’s 
enterprise sector, this association has become increasingly fluid.  Within our data set of 
large and medium-size enterprises, for example, in 1999, 1,417 of the approximately 
11,000 state-owned enterprises, reported a minority of state asset ownership.  Conversely, 
1,935 of the more than 11,000 so-called non-state enterprises reported that a majority of 
their assets were state owned.  These reconfigured patterns of asset ownership across the 
range of ownership classifications increasingly bring into question the economic 
significance of the conventional system of formal classifications. In Section 5, we test the 
relative economic importance of formal ownership classification and asset composition 
for a range of performance measures.  Within the context of our discussion of the 
historical progression of ownership reform in China, this asset restructuring often created 
defacto conversion, thereby enabling formal conversion to become a mere formality.                                       
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 For documentation of the rise of competition in state industry, see Naughton (1992). 
6 See Jefferson, Rawski, Li, and Zhang (2000). 6 
Conversion.  In the mid-1990s, the results of the three restructuring processes 
described above – new entry which fostered competition and search for technical and 
organizational innovations, a strengthening of the managerial control that motivated 
privatization, and the accumulation of non-state assets that contributed to the defacto 
erosion of government control – created pressures for deep restructuring, including the 
formal conversion of SOEs.
7   At the same time, the accumulation of non-performing 
loans and attention to financial stability associated with the Asian Financial Crisis and the 
Chinese leadership’s quest for entry into the World Trade Organization magnified 
pressures for enterprise restructuring.  
Specifically, three restructuring policies emerged during the mid-1990s.  The first 
of these was a furlough policy (xiagang), which by the end of the decade, led to the lay 
off of approximately six million of 44 million workers in the industrial SOE workforce 
(Rawski, 2002).  During the latter half of the 1990s, two additional policy initiatives 
shifted the locus of enterprise reform to the formal conversion of both state and collective 
enterprise.  Having diminished the role of the state sector as the locus of guaranteed 
employment, the government’s furlough program made conversion more politically 
feasible. 
Under the slogan “retain the large, release the small” (juada fangxiao), China’s 
leadership, in principle, mandated converting all but the largest 300 or so of the nation’s 
industrial SOEs. As part of this initiative, Premier Zhu Rongji placed China’s loss-
making SOEs on a strict three-year schedule during which they were instructed to 
implement a “modern enterprise system” and convert losses to surpluses.  The principal 
                                                           
7 See Su and Jefferson (2003).   7 
response to these mandates was a rapid acceleration in the number of conversions across 
both China’s state and collective sectors.   
While the shareholding experiment had been first introduced in 1993, it was not 
until the restructuring initiatives of 1997-98 that shareholding conversion became a 
broad-based initiative involving the conversion of large numbers of both SOEs and 
COEs.  In 1997, the Chinese Communist Party’s 15
th Party Congress made the 
shareholding system a centerpiece of China’s enterprise restructuring.  While formal 
privatization was ruled out for ideological reasons, the shareholding experiment was 
widely viewed as a covert mandate for privatization (Li, Li, and Zhang, 2000, p. 269).  
From 1997 to 2001, the number of registered state-owned enterprises declined by nearly 
one half.   According to Fan Gang (2002), “preliminary provincial data indicate that in 
some regions more than 70 percent of small SOEs have been privatized or restructured” 
(p. 3).  This conversion of state-owned enterprises was not limited to small-size 
enterprises.  During the 1997-2001 period, the number of large and medium-size SOEs 
declined from 14,811 to 8,675, while the number of large and medium-size shareholding 
enterprises mushroomed from 1,801 to 5,659.   
Furthermore, the conversion process extended to collective-owned enterprises, 
including the township and village enterprise sector that had earlier been celebrated for 
its competitive performance (Weitzman and Xu, 1994).  Li and Rozelle, in the year 2000, 
reported that the privatization of rural industry had been “deep and fundamental.”  They 
found that “more than 50 percent of local government-owned firms have transferred their 
shares to the private sector, partially or completely.”   This process of conversion has 
been extensive even among the largest, most successful collective-owned enterprises.  8 
During 1998 to 2001, the number of large and medium-size COEs declined by 35 percent 
from 3,613 in 1998 to 2,465 in 2001.     
Summarizing, our view is that the convergence of three factors – new entry and 
competition, strengthened managerial control, and the accumulation of non-state assets –
created the conditions for formal conversion during the latter half of the 1990s.  Many 
local governments were anxious to rid themselves of loss-making enterprises (or to cash 
in on profitable ones before they turned sour), insider managers were poised to secure 
greater control over these enterprises, and often asset structures were already extensively 
diversified.  Together, these three conditions together provided strong motive to complete 
the administrative formalities of shareholder conversion. 
 
3.  Literature Review and Comparative Perspective   
Our literature review is intended to serve two purposes.  The first is to cull lessons 
from surveys of the enterprise restructuring and privatization literature, most of which is 
focused on the experiences of Eastern Europe and the CIS, that may relate to China.  The 
second purpose is to review specifically the literature on restructuring China’s 
enterprises.   
Review of the literature on privatization and restructuring.   
The literature on privatization includes three comprehensive reviews of the 
privatization experience in transition and developing economies.  These are Megginson 
and Netter (“From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization,” 
2001), Birdsall and Nellis (“Winners and Losers: Assessing the Distributional Impact of 9 
Privatization,” 2002), and Djankov and Murrell (“Enterprise Restructuring in Transition,” 
2002).  In each of these reviews, we identify the salient findings. 
Megginson and Netter (2001) present a comprehensive review of 12 studies of the 
effectiveness of privatization in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
and six studies from the Commonwealth of Independent States, consisting of Russia and 
the former Soviet Republics.  Their study also reviews salient privatization episodes in 
OECD and non-transition developing economies.  Key conclusions from this sample of 
privatization experience include (i) privatization improves firm-level performance, (ii) 
concentrated private ownership, foreign ownership, and majority outside ownership are 
associated with significantly greater improvement than the alternatives, and (iii) the 
impact of privatization on employment is ambiguous, since employment falls for virtually 
all firms in transition economies. 
Most of these studies limit their scope to productivity, profitability, and 
occasionally employment.  Among those reviewed by Megginson and Netter, the study 
by La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) of the privatization of 218 Mexican SOEs spans 
the widest range of performance impacts.  According to the authors, as a result of 
privatization, the output of the privatized firms in their sample increased by 54.3 percent, 
and employment declined by half, although wages for the surviving workers increased.  
Firms achieved a 24 percent increase in operating profitability, eliminating the need for 
subsidies equal to 12.7 percent of GDP.  Higher product prices explain five percent of 
improvement, transfers from laid off workers explain 31 percent, and incentive-related 
productivity gains account for the remaining 64 percent. 10 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) draw on more than 100 studies of enterprise 
restructuring in transition economies.  Their approach is distinctive in its attempt to 
synthesize the studies into composite rankings of the effectiveness of various 
privatization strategies and outcomes.   Like Megginson and Netter, Djankov and Murrell 
find that state ownership within traditional state firms is less effective than all other 
ownership types. Privatization to outsiders is associated with the largest restructuring 
gains; furthermore, privatization to workers has no effect in Eastern Europe and is 
detrimental in the CIS.  Privatization to outsiders is associated with 50 percent more 
restructuring than privatization to insider managers and workers.  Investment funds, 
foreigners, and other block-holders produce more than ten times as much restructuring as 
diffuse individual ownership.  State ownership within partially privatized firms is 
surprisingly effective, producing more restructuring than enterprise insiders and non-
block-holder outsiders.  An interesting conclusion of Djankov and Murrell is that 
different regions – particularly Eastern Europe and the CIS economies – exhibit different 
responses to similar privatization strategies.  Whereas, for example, privatization to 
workers in Eastern Europe had no significant effect on enterprise performance, in the CIS 
economies, the same means of privatization resulted in substantial negative effects for the 
affected firms.  Also, opening to import competition had significant and opposite impacts 
on firm performance in Eastern Europe and the CIS.  These disparate impacts across 
regions raise the possibility that aspects of the privatization experience elsewhere in the 
world may have limited application to China. 
Birdsall and Nellis (2002) develop the theme that, by altering the distribution of 
costs and benefits of ownership, privatization potentially affects a broader range of 11 
stakeholders than accounted for in the conventional privatization literature.  They find 
that privatization programs appear to have worsened the distribution of assets and 
income, at least in the short run.  This tendency toward a less equal distribution of assets 
is more evident in transition economies than in Latin America.  Birdsall and Nellis also 
distinguish distributive effects across industries.  They find that the adverse distributional 
effects of privatization have been less severe for utilities, such as electricity and 
telecommunications, where the poor have tended to benefit from much greater access, 
than for banks, oil companies, and other natural resource producers. 
While the number of China-specific studies included in these three reviews is 
limited, we are particularly interested in the broad common findings based on a 
comprehensive review of the literature that may have bearing on China’s experience with 
enterprise restructuring.  Among these are: (i) the relative effectiveness of outsider 
privatization, (ii) the relatively poor performance of insider privatization, (iii) the 
effectiveness of state ownership within partially privatized firms, (iv) adverse 
distributional effects of the privatization of assets, and (v) ambiguous employment 
effects. 
Review of the research on Chinese enterprise restructuring.   
In recent years, research has begun to appear on the determinants and impacts of 
privatization and ownership conversion in China.  We summarize some of the key 
research results of that literature. 
Tian (2001) uses a sample of 826 corporations listed on China’s stock market to 
study the impact of state shareholding on corporate value.  Tian discovers a U-shaped 
relationship between the proportion of government equity and corporate value with 12 
higher values for low and high shares of government equity than for values associated 
with intermediate shares of government ownership.  He argues that the U-shape reflects 
the behavior of a government that is maximizing its overall interests. In the intermediate 
range, governments tend to exhibit a “grabbing hand,” which induces lower corporate 
values.  As the government’s equity share increases, becoming sufficiently large, the 
government provides “helping hands” thereby increasing overall corporate value.  
Li and Rozelle (2000) focus on a sample of 168 township enterprises in Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang Provinces of which 88 have been privatized.  They find that “transitional 
costs apparently reduce private firm efficiency in the year that firms are being 
privatized.”  However, Li and Rozelle find that two or more years after privatization, 
private firms produce five to seven percent more output with the same inputs.  They 
further surmise that “as privatized firms complete their ownership transition and continue 
to learn how to adapt to China’s business environment that the gains could rise further.”  
An important insight of this study is the presence of adjustment costs in the conversion 
process, which may result in a lag between conversion and realized benefits. 
Dong, Bowles, and Ho (2002a) investigate the determinants of employee share 
ownership in Jiangsu and Shandong provinces.  Their analysis shows that the 
privatization process resulted in a higher concentration of share ownership in 
management and other board members.  While regular employees owned shares in 16 of 
the 39 privatized enterprises in the sample, even in these enterprises, the distribution of 
shares was highly skewed towards those who were wealthier, male, local residents, and in 
managerial positions.  Dong et al find that the privatization process exhibits an important 
political dimension in which local leaders sell dominant ownership shares to managers, 13 
subject to the leaders’ revenue objectives and the wealth constraints of managers.  The 
effect of this pattern of shareholding is to increase the degree of earnings inequality 
within the enterprise and presumably more broadly in China’s rural society. 
  Based on the survey used in 2000a, Dong, Bowles, and Ho (2002b) report the 
impacts of share ownership on employee attitudes. Their results indicate that, in general, 
employee shareholders have higher levels of job satisfaction, perceive greater degrees of 
participation in enterprise decision making, display stronger organizational commitment, 
and exhibit more positive attitudes towards the privatization process than non-
shareholders in privatized firms. 
Su and Jefferson (2003) investigate the determinants of ownership conversion in 
China’s large and medium-size enterprises.  They find that the probability of ownership 
conversion increases with the firm’s profitability, its productivity, and the intensity of 
competition faced by the firm. The authors further find that the probability of conversion 
falls with firm size.  This latter result is consistent with the government’s policy of 
releasing the smaller firms and retaining the larger firms.  These results confirm the 
presence of selection bias in the privatization process of Chinese SOEs.  In evaluating the 
effects of ownership and ownership restructuring on firm performance, estimation 
procedures should recognize and account for the phenomenon of selection bias.   
Li, Li, and Zhang (2000) enlarge on the finding of Su and Jefferson regarding the 
role of competition in driving conversion.  According to Li, Li, and Zhang, competition 
requires local governments to improve the efficiency of SOEs and COEs under their 
jurisdiction.  The authors also conclude that because the efforts of managers are not 
verifiable, local governments often respond by granting total or partial residual shares to 14 
the managers.  By concluding that “intense competition stimulates the rise of a private 
property system” (p. 269), the authors postulate a certain inevitable quality to a process in 
which reform and competition lead to privatization, with an emphasis on insider 
privatization. These findings are consistent with our heuristic model of Chinese enterprise 
conversion outlined in Section 2 in which entry and competition and the reform of 
managerial control rights served as antecedents to the conversion movement that began in 
the late 1990s. 
 
4.  China’s Large and Medium-Size Enterprises: The Data Set 
The statistical system, which China uses to track its industrial enterprises, can be 
enlikened to three concentric circles, or populations, of enterprises.  The largest 
population consists of a count of all of the enterprises in the industrial system.  In 1997, 
according to Table 1, this broad measure included 7.9 million enterprises.  For this 
inclusive enterprise population, China’s statistical authorities report only skeletal 
information – generally not more than the total number of enterprises and gross industrial 
output.   
The middle circle, consisting of less than five percent of China’s total industrial 
enterprise population, includes enterprises reporting more than five million yuan of sales 
annually; all state-owned enterprises are included regardless of their annual sales.  
Relative to the total enterprise population, the statistical authorities collect and report a 
broader set of measures for these enterprises, including basic measures of financial 
performance, such as profits and loses.  15 
Finally, the inner circle of China’s industrial enterprise statistical system consists 
of the country’s large and medium-size enterprises (LMEs).  As shown in Table 2, in the 
last year of the old accounting system, these LMEs accounted for approximately 57 
percent of the total sales of enterprises with annual sales in excess of 5 million yuan; 
during 1998 to 2001, the share of total industrial sales represented by LMEs rose from 
57.9 percent to 62.4 percent.  China’s industrial authorities collect highly detailed 
information from the approximately 22,000 firms that it classifies as large and medium 
size.  These firms and the data they report constitute the database for this study. 
This collection of large and medium-size enterprises, whose performance is 
carefully tracked by China’s NBS, at once includes China’s most successful companies – 
those that have grown and sustained their status at the pinnacle of China’s industrial 
enterprise sector – as well as many of its most troubled enterprises.  As the focus of 
decades of central planning and administered allocations of subsidized capital, skilled 
labor, and raw materials, some of these large and medium-size state-owned enterprises 
continue to impede China’s transition to an advanced market economy.  
During the period covered by our panel of data – 1995 to 2001 – the NBS 
changed its system of ownership classification.  For the purpose of comparing categories 
of ownership and tracking ownership reform between 1995 and 2001, we use the 
concordance shown in Annex I, which aligns the 1998 system of ownership classification 
with the preexisting system.  This aggregation of 23 detailed categories into seven 
broader categories – state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs), Hong-Kong, Macao, and Taiwan-owned enterprises (HKT), foreign-owned 
enterprises (FOR), shareholding enterprises (SKT), and other domestic enterprises (OTH) 16 
– closely tracks the classification system currently used in the China Statistical 
Yearbook.
8  Using this concordance, we have compiled for Table 3 a description of the 
changing ownership profile of China’s LME sector. 
 
5.  Performance by Firms with Established Ownership Classifications 
Although this study investigates the consequences of a change in formal 
ownership structure, we first focus on the question of why ownership classification 
matters in Chinese industry.  To do this, we compare performance across established 
ownership types.  We do this in three ways.  The first is to incorporate a set of ownership 
dummies, which enables direct comparisons by ownership type.  The second approach 
acknowledges the disparities that sometimes exist between the ownership designation of 
a firm and its mix of assets.  Our second approach, therefore, examines the impact of 
asset composition – the share of state-owned assets and the combined share of foreign 
and Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan-owned assets – on firm performance.  The third 
approach examines the combined impact on performance of both ownership classification 
and asset composition.   
We perform this comparison for eight measures.  These are: labor productivity, 
capital productivity, profitability, employment, wages, taxes paid, new product sales, and 
R&D intensity.  The profitability measure represents the difference between sales 
revenue and the production costs of sold output.  It excludes, therefore, certain taxes, 
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qualify as large or medium-size enterprises), (ii) it distinguishes between foreign owned and Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan-owned enterprises, and (iii) it breaks out private-ownership from the category of 
“enterprises of other type of ownership.” (NBS, 2000, p. 407). 17 
pension payments, welfare subsidies, and other costs that are not directly associated with 
production. 
The results, shown in Tables 4a-c, are summarized below: 
•  Table 4a shows that ownership classifications exhibit a highly significant association 
with performance.  SOEs tend to report lower labor and capital productivity and 
wages,
9 yet SOEs exhibit higher profitability than all the other classifications with 
the exception of the collective and shareholding sectors.  While lower wages in 
SOEs may explain a tendency for sales profits in SOEs to be higher, Table 4a also 
shows that employment and taxes are higher in SOEs than for other ownership 
classifications.  The tendency for SOEs to operate in less competitive industries, 
such as tobacco and petroleum, may also explain the relative profit advantage of 
SOEs, although some of this effect is captured by the inclusion of regression 
dummies at the 2-digit industry level. 
•  Table 4b reports the estimation results for the impact on performance of asset 
composition alone.  We construct two measures of asset shares – those for state-
owned assets (STATE) and assets originating from foreign sources, which include 
investors in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (FOR/HKT).  The omitted third 
category of assets is other domestic assets, whose impact is represented by the 
constant in each of the equations.  The coefficients on STATE and FOR/HKT should 
therefore be interpreted in relation to the magnitudes shown in the constants.  Our 
results show that STATE impacts negatively on labor and capital productivity and on 
wages; conversely STATE is positively associated with profitability, employment, 
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compensation provided by SOEs may not be relatively low. 18 
new products and R&D expenditures.  The FOR/HKT asset share exhibits a pattern 
of performance outcomes, which is virtually the inverse of the STATE asset shares.  
Enterprises that are rich in FOR/HKT assets exhibit high levels of labor and capital 
productivity and wages.  Conversely, FOR/HKT is strongly associated with 
profitability, employment, taxes, new product sales, and R&D intensity.  
•  Table 4c includes estimates of the performance impact of both ownership 
classification and asset composition.  We can see in the table that for the most part 
the estimates of the coefficients on both ownership classification and asset type are 
statistically significant.   
Overall, the results in Tables 4a-c demonstrate the explanatory powers of both 
ownership classification and asset shares.  This conclusion is based on the fact that the 
adjusted R-square values for all eight performance equations in Table 4c that include 
both classification and asset share are larger than the adjusted R-squares reported for the 
ownership classification and asset share equations separately.  This result underscores the 
importance of distinguishing between the impact of a change in ownership classification 
and a change of asset composition on enterprise performance. 
While Tables 4a-c provide a useful perspective on performance differences across 
ownership types, this analysis may be of limited predictive value regarding the impact on 
a given firm of change in ownership from state ownership to shareholding status. This 
ambiguity is true for the following reasons: 
•  Selection bias. The differential quality of converted and unconverted firms may 
reflect selection bias.  That is, SOEs that are chosen for conversion may not be 
typical of the existing population of SOEs.  The notable consequence of selection 19 
bias is that, if relative to the average, converted SOEs are say high-quality SOEs, 
then following a period after the conversion, any measured quality advantage of the 
converted SOEs may reflect selection bias rather than the salutary consequences of 
conversion.   
•  Adjustment costs.  Following the conversion, time may be required to adjust to new 
governance arrangements and achieve efficiency improvements associated with 
changes in the firm’s labor force, asset composition, and product mix.  Li and 
Rozelle (2000) find evidence of “transitional costs” in their investigation of the 
privatization of rural collectives.  The result is that gains ensuing from privatization 
may appear only one-to-two years after conversion. 
We formally test for selection bias but can only speculate on the importance of transition 
costs.  
 
6. The Sample of Converted Enterprises 
Using our samples of converted and unconverted SOEs and COEs, we test for 
patterns of selection bias.  We do this by testing whether the firms that have been selected 
for conversion are more or less likely in the year prior to their conversion, t-1, to have 
exhibited a high or low measure of any of the eight performance measures.   
Before conducting the selection bias analysis, we construct samples of both 
converted and unconverted enterprises for which we use the latter as a control. The data 
set consists of a balanced sample of SOEs and COEs.  To be included in the sample a 
firm must report data for the year prior to its conversion (i.e. t-1) continuously through 
2001.  Within the sample, the included conversion years are t =1996, 1997, 1998, and 20 
1999.  Because the proximity of 2000 to 2001 is likely to diminish the realized impact of 
conversion, we exclude firms that were converted in 2000.  We also eliminate enterprises 
that report multiple conversions, i.e. those that convert from SOE or COE to STK and 
then again convert to some other ownership type.  Finally, we eliminate firms that report 
implausible figures for key variables, such as zero or negative sales or fixed capital 
stock.
10  
Tables 5a and 5b profile the conversions of SOEs and COEs during 1996 to 2001.  
Table 6a shows that over the period 1996 to 2001 a total of 3,036 state-owned enterprises 
were converted to non-state enterprises.  Among these, 2,265, i.e. 75 percent, entailed 
conversions of SOEs to shareholding enterprises.  The lower panel identifies the number 
of enterprises that report a single conversion, for which the key data are continuously 
available from t-1 to 2001, and for which the data observations are plausible.  Within our 
sample, 404 enterprises satisfy these criteria.  Since we do not include conversions that 
were reported in the year 2000, our effective sample size for the SOE conversions is 
258.
11  The 3,569 SOEs that were not converted constitute the part of the sample that 
allows us to identify the nature of selection bias and the independent impact of 
conversion.  For the collectives, Table 5b shows that among the 1,614 reported 
conversions, 970 were conversions of COEs to shareholding enterprises.  Among these, 
                                                           
10 Note in Annex 1 that three kinds of state-owned enterprises are specified.  Our sample includes only two 
of these – state-owned enterprises and wholly state-owned enterprises.  We do not include state-owned 
jointly operated enterprises, which involve hybrid ownership and already include some of the attributes of 
shareholding enterprises. 
11 A substantial number of converted enterprises change their ID in the conversion process and therefore 
cannot be tracked before and after the conversion process.  Efforts to match these pre- and post-converted 
enterprises indicate that conversions involving changing in industry classifications, size classifications, or 
locations raise the likelihood of the issuance of a new ID.  Our sample, therefore, while a fraction of the 
total number of converted enterprises, tends to control for industry, size, and location, so that the 
comparative statistical analysis focuses on the independent effect of conversion. 21 
103 enterprises satisfy the criteria for a single conversion, continuous data, and plausible 
observations.  The unconverted subset consists of 858 COEs. 
Applying logit analysis to the sample described above, we estimate the probability 
of firms with certain performance characteristics being converted.  As shown in Table 6, 
our principal findings are that, relative to the unconverted SOEs, the firms that are 
selected for conversion exhibit high levels of both labor and capital productivity and 
profitability.  They also exhibit relatively low levels of employment and relatively high 
tax burdens.  The COEs that are selected for conversion are distinguished by relatively 
high R&D intensity and marginally greater profitability.   
Table 7 identifies the distribution of converted enterprises across industry 
classifications.  The table shows that the profiles of the total sample and the converted 
firms are similar, with several exceptions.  Only 2 percent of the converted enterprises are 
mining firms compared with 7.4 percent of the total sample.  Also, electric power firms 
are substantially underrepresented in the sample of conversions.  By contrast, nearly one-
quarter of the converted firms, twice as many as those that appear in the underlying 
sample, are located in the chemical sector.  Like SOEs, the machinery sector accounts for 
nearly one-third of COE conversions.  The textile, apparel and leather products 
industries, which were not highly represented among SOE conversions, account for 
nearly one-quarter of COE conversions.    
Finally, we examine the regional bias of the conversion process.  Because we find 
a tendency for the more successful firms to enjoy a higher probability of conversion, we 
are not surprised to see in Table 8 that relative to other regions, SOEs located in China’s 
eastern and southern provinces enjoy a larger probability of conversion.  While, like 22 
SOEs, COEs located in the eastern provinces exhibit a higher probability of conversion,  
COEs located in China’s southern provinces are among the least likely to be converted. 
 
7.  Impact of Conversion on Enterprise Performance: 
Research Methodology 
 
Our research method for analyzing the performance impact of the conversion of 
SOEs and COEs to shareholding enterprises is as follows: 
1.  Identify the relevant set of performance variables.  The study examines the impact of 
conversion and asset ownership change on eight performance measures.  These are: 
labor productivity, capital productivity, profitability, employment, wages, taxes paid, 
new product sales, and R&D intensity.  For each of our performance measures, we 
compare for converted vs. unconverted enterprises their levels of performance in 
2001 controlling for performance levels in t-1, the year prior to conversion.  By 
controlling for the performance levels of firms in the year prior to conversion, our 
research methodology controls for selection bias. 
2.  Estimate the contributions of six factors to each of the eight performance measures.   
Our formal estimation equation is: 
 
   lnZj,01 = α0 + α1STKt + α2∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01 +  α3(∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01)*DSTK 
                       + α4DSTA_LPt-1 to 01 + α5lnZj,t-1 + ε1,                           (1) 
          
where Zj,01 includes the set of eight performance measures (i.e. j = 1…8).  The six 
factors that determine Zj,01 are: 
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•  the independent effect of conversion, holding the firm’s asset structure fixed (i.e.,  
α1STKt); 
•  a reduction in the share of state-owned assets, controlling for the firm’s formal 
ownership classification (i.e., α2∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01);  
•  the differential impact of the effect of reductions in the share of state-owned assets in 
converted versus unconverted enterprises [i.e., α3(∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01)*DSTK].  If α3 < 
0; the implication is that a given reduction in the state-owned asset share of a 
converted enterprise has a larger impact on the relevant performance measure than a 
similar reduction in the state-owned asset share for an unconverted enterprise.  
•  an increase (rather than a decrease) in the share of state-owned assets (i.e., 
α4DSTA_LPt-1 to 01); we use a (0,1) dummy to capture the effect of an increase in the 
state’s asset share following conversion. 
•  a tendency for catch-up by lagging firms (i.e. reversion to the mean) (i.e., α5lnZj,t-1), 
and  
•  the unexplained part captured by the residual or error term (i.e. ε6). 
We estimate equation (1) and report the results in the following section. 
 
8. Estimation Results 
We estimate equation (1) using the sample described in Section 6; the estimation 
results are shown in Table 9a, for SOEs, and Table 9b, for COEs.  Both sets of estimates 
used pooled data for both converted and unconverted enterprises. 24 
 Estimates of the conversion equations.  We first review our regression results for 
the SOE sample.  In addition to the results shown in Table 9a, a summary list of 
outcomes are grouped in the left-hand column of Table 10. 
•  Direct impact of conversion.  Absent changes in asset structure, the effects of the 
conversion of SOEs to shareholding enterprises include increases in capital 
productivity, employment, new product sales, and R&D intensity. Wages and 
profitability decline.  Three of these impacts invite commentary.  One is the growth 
(or slower decline) of employment resulting from conversion.  These conversions 
occurred during a period when furloughs of workers (i.e. xiagang) were widespread 
within the state sector.  Moreover, we see in Table 6 that the enterprises selected for 
conversion exhibited relatively low levels of employment prior to conversion.  
Efforts to obtain approval from public authorities to convert state-owned enterprises 
to shareholding enterprises may have included negotiations and agreements with 
workers, a key stakeholder in the conversion process, that layoffs would be avoided 
or limited.  The additional finding that conversion by itself tends to be associated 
with downward wage adjustments suggests that the quid pro quo for the retention of 
workers was wage reductions or slower wage growth.  Finally, the reduction in profit 
associated with conversions may reflect what Li and Rozelle characterize (2000) as 
“transitional costs.”  They may also reflect the “grabbing hand” of the government 
(Tian, 2001) or other stakeholders during the conversion process.  
•  Impact of a reduction in the state’s asset share.  A reduction in the state’s asset 
ownership share subsequent to conversion accounts for some of the most robust 
impacts of the conversion process.  Reductions in state asset shares are significantly 25 
associated with rising labor and capital productivity.  Paradoxically, notwithstanding 
the rise in labor and capital productivity, profitability is relatively unaffected by 
declining state asset shares.  We see that the elasticities of gains in labor productivity 
growth and wage growth with respect to declines in state asset shares are of similar 
magnitude and may therefore cancel.  However, the gain in capital productivity, 
coupled with the reduction in tax burden, might be expected to translate into higher 
profitability.  Reductions in the share of non-state assets are also associated with 
both a rise in R&D intensity and new product sales, which may auger still greater 
productivity advantages for the converted shareholding enterprises.  The increase in 
R&D spending may help to explain the apparent decline in profitability.  A 
comparison of the induced impacts of conversion relative to the direct impacts 
indicates that some of the impacts operate in opposite directions (i.e. employment 
and wages), whereas others (i.e. capital productivity, new product sales, and R&D 
intensity) are directly enhanced by conversion as well as associated reductions in 
state asset shares. 
•  Differential impact of reduced state asset shares for converted vs. unconverted 
enterprises.  For all but two performance measures, we find that the impact of 
reductions in state asset shares exhibit no distinguishable differences as between our 
samples of converted and unconverted enterprises.  Where we find no significant 
effect, we restrict the coefficient α3 = 0.  For our sample of converted SOEs, 
equivalent reductions in state asset shares appear to have comparatively smaller 
impacts on new product sales and R&D intensity.   We account for these differences 
in the calculation of the total conversion effects. 26 
•  Impact of an increase in state asset share.  Some enterprises experience increases in 
the share of state-owned assets over the period t-1 to 2001.
12   The inclusion of a 
dummy variable for enterprises in which the post-conversion share of state assets 
rise allows us to test whether increases and decreases in state-owned asset shares 
exhibit opposite impacts on enterprises performance.  We find that increases in asset 
shares of the state generally have no effect; while larger state shares are associated 
with higher labor productivity growth and lower growth in profitability, the 
statistical significance of these associations is not very robust.  
•  Catch-up.  The coefficient on the lagged performance measure, i.e. α5lnZj,t-1, 
identifies the degree of catch-up or convergence, i.e. the extent to which by firms 
with unusually high or low initial performance levels tend by 2001 to revert to the 
mean.  For example, the profitability equation, for which  α5 = 0.500, indicates 
substantial catch-up, i.e. firms with high profitability in t-1 tend to sustain only half 
of their initial advantage, after controlling for conversion and asset mix.  By 
comparison, the employment equation for which α5 = 0.944 indicates little change in 
relative employment levels over the period t-1 to 2001.  The phenomenon of catch-
up may overturn the anticipated impacts of conversion on actual measures of 
performance.  In particular, since selection bias is associated with higher levels of 
productivity and profitability, the impact of conversion on these performance 
measures may be diminished by the phenomenon of catch-up.   
Table 9b reports the estimation results for the sample of collective-owned 
enterprises; the results are summarized in Table 10. 
                                                           
12 Our sample of converted SOEs includes just 3 such cases. 27 
•  Direct impact of conversion.  Conversion of COEs to shareholding enterprises 
accelerates the growth of capital productivity and weakly improves profitability.  
Similar to converted SOEs, we find that a consequence of conversion is the tendency 
to retain or add employment relative to the unconverted sample.  Again, this 
outcome may be a reflection of the efforts of workers and local leaders to use 
conversion as an opportunity to stem layoffs or increase jobs. Relative to 
unconverted COEs, new product sales rise.  None of the other performance measures 
is significantly affected by the independent effect of conversion. 
•  Impact of a reduction in the state’s asset share. For collective-owned enterprises, 
reductions in the state’s asset share have no highly significant impact on firm 
performance.  This outcome is unsurprising, since the share of state ownership in 
COEs is relatively low.  As shown in Table 11, for unconverted firms, the state’s 
asset share falls from 7.3 to 3.2 percent; for converted firms, the share declines from 
9.1 to 2.1 percent.  We find no evidence that reductions in the state’s asset share 
exert differential impacts on converted and unconverted COEs. 
•  Impact of an increase in the state’s asset share. An increase in the share of state-
owned assets subsequent to conversion exhibits no impact on any of the eight 
performance measures. 
•  Catch-up.  As with state-owned enterprises, we find a general pattern of catch-up or 
reversion to the mean, conditional on controlling for the conversion variables.  With 
the exception of labor, for which we find little tendency for catch-up, most of the 
variables exhibit a substantial tendency to revert to the mean. 28 
The impact of conversion on asset structure. For SOEs, we find that reductions in 
state asset shares substantially impact many of the performance measures that we 
examine in this study.  It may be that formal conversion of an SOE to a shareholding 
enterprise has no affect on the asset composition of the firm; alternatively, it may be that 
conversion substantially enhances the ability of the firm to reduce the state-owned share 
of its assets. We use the following equation to test the impact of conversion on the firm’s 
asset composition. 
 
              ∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01 = β0 + β1STKt + ε2     (2) 
 
If in equation (2) β1 > 0, we conclude that conversion speeds the reduction in the 
state’s asset share.  Table 11 shows that the estimate of β1 is highly statistically 
significant; converted SOEs are significantly more able than unconverted SOEs to reduce 
their share of state owned assets. Consistent with this result, we see in Table 12 that for 
converted SOEs the ratio of state-owned assets falls to nearly one-half of the ratio prior to 
conversion, whereas for unconverted enterprises, the decline is closer to 20 percent.   By 
comparison with SOEs, Table 11 shows that converted COEs seem not to enjoy an 
advantage relative to their unconverted counterparts in achieving reductions in their state-
owned asset shares.   
Means of reducing the state’s share of assets. We further investigate the issue of 
whether measured reductions in the state’s asset ownership share result from the 
accumulation of new non-state investment or from the conversion of state-owned assets 
to non-state ownership.  Examining our sample of converted enterprises, we find that the 29 
quantity of state owned assets rises from an average of 38.6 billion yuan in t-1 to 43.1 
billion yuan in 2001.  The concurrent increase in non-state assets from 47.6 billion yuan 
to 98.6 billion yuan accounts for the decline in state-owned asset ownership in 2001 to 
nearly one half (i.e. 0.540) of their share in t-1.  We draw two conclusions from these 
findings.  First, conversion results in a substantially enhanced ability to attract non-state 
investment.  The associated finding that conversion tends not to reduce the volume of 
existing state-owned assets carries two implications.  One is that conversion does not 
seem to result in the transfer – either through sale or “give-away” – of state-owned assets 
to non-state interests.  The second is that conversion is not associated with the break up 
of the SOE into parts with high-performing state assets being captured by the converted 
enterprise, while chronic non-performing assets and debt obligations are left behind as 
wards of the state and banking system.  While examples of these arrangements – 
involving both stripping and creaming the best of the state-owned assets – exist, they do 
not appear to characterize the firms in our sample. 
The issue of endogeneity.  Before we settle on these regression results, we need to 
address the issue of potential endogeneity bias in the estimates of Equation (1).  
Specifically, we are concerned about the case in which non-state investors take into 
account the rate of change in one of our performance measures in determining where to 
invest.  Specifically, suppose that investment is attracted to the firms that enjoy the most 
robust growth of profitability, i.e. for a given level of profit in t-1, they enjoy a high level 
of profit in 2001.  This sensitivity of the investment decision to the dependent profit 
variable causes the rate of non-state investment – and hence ∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01 – to be 
correlated not only because investment reduced the state’s asset share, which, in turn 30 
raised profitability – that is, the impact that the coefficient α2 is intended to capture – but 
also because the robust growth of profit has attracted more investment.  The introduction 
of this additional source of correlation – causality running from the growth of profit to 
the reduction in state-owned asset share – causes the (absolute) magnitude of α2 to be 
biased upward.  Under these conditions, we would attribute more importance to the 
impact of reductions in the state-asset share to increases in profitability than we should. 
In principle, we can use one of two approaches to address the problem of 
simultaneity bias.  The first is to create an instrumental variable for ∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01.  We 
attempted this without success.
13  The second approach is to create a lag structure 
between the dependent and independent variables.  This approach can be justified if we 
expect the variable ∆lnST_SHt-1 to act on the dependent variable ∆lnZj,t-1 to 01 with a lag, 
but we do not expect the dependent variable to act on past values of the right-hand-side 
variable.  While in principle, a lag structure can lead to as robust a, or an even more 
robust, relationship than the contemporaneous form, it has the advantage of reducing the 
likelihood that the dependent variable, which is moved toward the future, can effectively 
influence the quasi-historical pattern of investment.  By substituting a one-year lag of the 
state asset share variable, i.e. ∆lnST_SHt-2 to 00, for the t-1 to 2001 variable, we might still 
anticipate that investment will drive firm performance, while at the same time curtailing 
the potential for simultaneity bias, i.e. the impact of performance on the firm’s asset mix. 
When we lag the asset ownership variable by one year, we find some change in 
the estimates.
14  The most notable is that whereas in Table 9a, the coefficient on the asset 
                                                           
13 We attempted a variety of IVs, for ∆lnZj,t-1 to 01, but none of the IV’s reported an adjusted R-square in 
excess of 0.06.    
14 This set of results is not reported.  Results can be made available upon request to the authors. 31 
variable in the capital productivity equation is quite robust, when we lag the asset 
variable one period, the coefficient on asset mix becomes insignificant.  At the same 
time, the asset mix coefficient in the profit equation becomes statistically significant.  
The remaining estimates retain levels of statistical significance that are comparable to 
those reported using the original contemporaneous time structure.  That estimates of the 
coefficient on lagged values of ∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01 in the capital productivity equation turn 
insignificant suggest that investment behavior may be particularly sensitive to capital 
productivity.  None of the other estimates exhibits nearly as much sensitivity to this 
indirect test of endogeneity as does the capital productivity equation.
15   
 
9.  Estimating the Total Impact of Conversion 
In order to estimate the total impact of conversion, we evaluate the combined 
impact of two avenues of impact associated with the conversion process.  These are the 
direct impact (α1) and the impact of the reduction in the share of state-owned assets that 
results from conversion [α3(∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01)].  Because for the innovation variables – 
new products and R&D spending - the reduction in state-asset shares affects performance 
differently for the converted and unconverted firms; for these two performance measures 
we incorporate these differences into the calculations [α3(∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01)*DSTK].  
Although we have estimated and reported the impact of an increase in the share of state-
owned assets in Table 9, because only a small number of firms exhibit such increases, we 
omit this factor from our calculations. By computing rates of growth in the performance 
                                                           
15 When we lag the independent variable, ∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01, the number of observations drops to 
approximately 9,000 from the larger sample number of observations of 13,243.  We have, therefore, 
implemented the test described above with this smaller sample.   32 
measures from t-1 to 2001, which we present as average annual rates, our estimates are 
not affected by selection bias.  The results are shown in Table 13.   
We first focus on the state-owned sector.  Table 13 shows three sets of growth 
rates.  Two actual rates compare the overall rates of growth of the performance measures 
for converted and unconverted enterprises.  The third set uses the method above to 
compute only that portion of each growth rate, which is attributable to conversion. These 
are to be compared with zero (0), the comparable implicit rates of growth for the 
unconverted SOEs.  This third set of rates shows that conversion results in systematic and 
extensive impacts on the newly created shareholding enterprises.  The growth of labor 
and capital productivity, employment, and taxes resulting from conversion each exceeds 
that of their counterpart unconverted enterprises, controlling for the catch-up factor.  The 
most dramatic impacts of conversion are on rates of growth of innovation expenditure 
and activity, i.e. R&D spending and new product sales.  Simultaneously, in comparison 
with the counterpart unconverted SOEs, we observe negative rates of growth of profit and 
wages.  Where the directions of impact of the direct and induced channels differ, as for 
employment and wages, we see that, at least within the period of our sample the direct 
impact dominates.  For employment, the direct impact of an increase in employment 
associated with the conversion event dominates the attrition of workers resulting from 
additional non-state investment.  Likewise, the dampening direct impact of conversion on 
wage growth persists even as converted firms succeed in attracting new non-state 
investment, which works to increase the pace of wage growth. 
 The lower half of Table 13 shows our estimates of the total impact of conversion 
on performance for our sample of converted collectives.  For each performance measures 33 
in which none of the relevant estimated coefficients shown in Table 9b is significant at 
least the 10 percent level, we assume that the relevant figure displayed in Table 13 is not 
statistically significant and therefore ignore it.  In Table 13, we find that conversion 
creates increases in rates of growth of capital productivity, profitability, employment, and 
new product sales.  
 
10. Conclusions and Implications for Governance and Distribution 
Our analysis examines the statistical link between enterprise conversion 
associated with China’s shareholding experiment, including its tendency to motivate new 
non-state investment and enhance measures of firm performance.  In concluding we 
attempt to infer or extend findings from the empirical results presented in this paper. 
First we attempt to infer the impact of the shareholding experiment on corporate 
governance and control.  Commenting on an earlier version of this paper, Bert Keidel 
observed:  “…control rather than ownership in China is clearly the most important issue.  
Because the ownership classification very often doesn’t give you a clue about who really 
controls the enterprise…the Party can govern who is the manager; [it] governs a lot of the 
goals of the enterprise in terms of its ancillary social investments…even [for a] privately-
owned enterprise…”
16 While we do not have access to direct observations on pre- and 
post-conversion managerial control rights, the most robust of the documented 
performance changes spur us to speculate on comparisons of conversion changes in 
corporate goals and behavior.  The systematic and extensive reallocation of effort and 
resources toward innovation – both R&D and new product development and sales – 34 
suggest two forms of change.  One is an emphasis on “deep restructuring” that entails 
process and product innovation; the second, related shift, is an extension of the time 
horizon of the firm’s owners and management. 
Because our analytical interests extend beyond the conventional interest 
concerning the impact of conversion on efficiency, we first examine the evidence from 
this study to determine the distributive impact of the conversion of Chinese SOEs to 
shareholding enterprises.  We then examine the normative or public policy implications 
of these distribution effects of conversion. 
Reviewing Table 13, we infer the following conclusions regarding the impact of 
conversion on the distribution of income and wealth across the stakeholders of China’s 
shareholding experiment. 
•  Over the time horizon of our analysis, we find that conversion increases the rate of 
growth (reduces the rate of decline) of employment.  It also slows wage growth.  
Table 13 shows that the rate of change of these variables is of equal and opposite 
magnitude.  We surmise, therefore, that in the near to medium term, the tenure of 
incumbent workers is extended by conversion, while the growth of their 
compensation is curtailed.  Over the long-term, the accumulation of non-state 
investment and decline in the state’s asset share tend to reverse the directions of 
change in employment and wages.   
•  A test of the impact of conversion on labor’s factor income share, i.e. the share of 
the wage bill (the product of employment and the wage) in total sales revenue, 
shows no change as a result of either the direct impact of conversion or the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Transcript of Bert Keidel’s comments on an earlier draft of this paper presented at the Conference on the 
Distributional Consequences of Privatization” (p. 3).  Minxin Pei also raised the issue of the implications of 35 
subsequent decline in the state’s asset share.  Conversion, therefore, does not appear 
to affect appreciably the distribution of revenues between labor and capital.  Within 
the wage pool, wage compensation may be skewed toward management and away 
from less skilled labor, but it is not substantially reallocated to bonuses and owners 
of capital. 
•  Subsequent to conversion, at least among the shareholding enterprises within our 
sample, the state – and the public – retain the assets that had existed in the pre-
converted SOEs.  The decline in the state’s asset shares seem to result not from the 
dissolution of state assets either by sale or “stripping”; rather the decline in shares 
results from the ability of converted enterprises to attract new investment.   
•  We do not have data on the asset ownership of managers.  However, because 
managers tend to serve as key players in the process of conversion of Chinese SOEs 
to shareholding enterprises, and because we observe significant increases in asset 
ownership by non-state stakeholders, we anticipate that managers capture a portion 
of the new assets that enter the firm.  We have no reason to believe that the finding 
of Li, Li and Zhang (2000) and Dong, Bowles, and Ho (2002a) are not applicable to 
our sample.  That is, as the principal instigators of ownership reform, which results 
on average in a doubling in non-state assets within the firm, managers of converted 
enterprises increase their net wealth.   
•  The evidence in support of deep restructuring, i.e. the expansion of R&D and new 
product development, as well as short- to medium-term efficiency gains that result 
from conversion, suggests that those who maintain an employment or financial 
interest in the firm will stand to gain with time.  Beyond the immediate stakeholders 
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of the firm, China’s consumer sector benefits from resources that are drawn into 
R&D and innovation.  During the past 10 to 15 years, a striking range of consumer 
goods as well as improvements in medical technologies and equipment for 
education, including a thriving computer industry have become widely available in 
China.  
•  As a result of the concentration of SOEs in China’s northeast and eastern regions, 
and the somewhat higher probability of their conversion in these regions, 
stakeholders who reside in coastal provinces are more likely to benefit from China’s 
shareholding experiment than those in other regions.  By comparison, the numbers of 
SOEs in China’s north and southwestern regions are relatively sparse and their 
probability of conversion is somewhat less than elsewhere.  Because these latter two 
regions are China’s poorest, these regional biases may cause China’s shareholding 
experiment to contribute to China’s growing regional inequalities. 
We have outlined the empirical findings relating to the impact of conversion on 
distribution.  What are the public policy implications of these findings?  We examine two 
normative aspects of the distributive findings outlined above.  These are the role of 
growing inequality in China’s economy and the appropriate public policy measures to 
deal with China’s growing inequality.   
First, we suggest that the implications of the distributive effect of enterprise 
restructuring differ across countries.  For a region like Latin America, privatization that 
exacerbates an already skewed distribution of income should be viewed critically .  
Restructuring that creates a skewing of asset-ownership in China, by contrast, may be a 
welcome phenomenon.  First, since prior to China’s economic reforms the accumulation 37 
of personal wealth was generally banned, it is inevitable that the introduction of elements 
of a market economy would lead to greater inequality of wages and assets.  Independent 
of the conversion of China’s domestic SOEs, the introduction of foreign investment and 
the entry of private enterprise would lead to skewing.   
We make two points.  The first is that seen from the narrow perspective of the 
impact of conversion of the original stakeholders of an SOE, conversion may lead to an 
unequal distribution of assets.  From a broader perspective, by contributing to the size of 
China’s emergent managerial and entrepreneurial class, the conversion of SOEs is 
creating a source of entrepreneurship and innovation in the Chinese economy that had 
been in scarce supply prior to China’s ownership reform.  By contributing to the size of 
China’s entrepreneurial and investment class and possibly competing away some of the 
monopoly rents being captured by China’s emergent entrepreneurs and investors, it is 
arguable that the shareholding experiment is creating more, not less, equality.  
The second issue concerns the notion of an “ideal” distribution of income.
17  Most 
would agree that during the period of central planning and socialist ownership, 
opportunities for personal investment in human, financial, and physical capital and the 
prospects of a “competitive” return on such investment were too limited.  China’s income 
and asset distribution was far too uniform.  The conversion of SOEs may be viewed as 
one avenue to redress this social inefficiency.  Within this context the issue is whether the 
reallocation and accumulation of income and assets is being accomplished through means 
that are appropriately transparent and fair.  Since Chinese society may be approaching a 
more efficient and desirable distribution of income – in terms of its ability to promote 38 
growth and rising living standards – the question facing the shareholding experiment is 
not so much whether the outcomes are equal, but rather whether the processes of 
conversion are transparent and equitable.  While anecdotal evidence suggests that aspects 
of the conversion process are not transparent and equitable, we infer, at least from our 
limited sample, that the assets the state retained at the beginning of the process remain 
intact.  We do not find in our sample widespread evidence of asset stripping. 
A further normative issue concerns the appropriate policy response to the finding 
that enterprise conversion contributes to inequality – assuming a legitimate process.  The 
question is the appropriate role that constraints on corporate governance should play in 
society’s quest for achieving its equity goals.  Public control over corporate governance 
should be viewed as but one of many instruments to be used by governments in the public 
pursuit of equity.  Others include taxation, education, economic freedom, such as 
mobility, and international trade policies.  As a matter of positive analysis, we wish to 
understand the broad distribution implications of conversion or privatization on the 
distribution of income and wealth.  Empirical results focused narrowly on outcomes at 
the firm level do not necessary provide a useful guide for the most useful policy response. 
In China, our finding that a rise in employment – or fewer layoffs – is often a direct 
effect of conversion suggests that the role of government and/or workers in the 
conversion process involves commitments to retain incumbent workers.  Across China, 
provincial and local governments continue efforts to construct effective social insurance 
systems, particularly unemployment insurance systems and pension systems that – at 
least in urban areas where SOEs are being converted – are able to provide a measure of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 See, for example, Forbes (2000) who finds that while on average countries grow faster if their Gini 
coefficient is lower, over time, individual countries that lower their Gini coefficients face slower growth of 39 
security.  Many of these institutional arrangements, however, remain rudimentary in 
comparison with established systems in the industrial economies.   
It remains too early in China’s process of enterprise restructuring to draw hard 
conclusions regarding its impact on the distribution of income and wealth in Chinese 
society.  One reason, as we demonstrate is that different channels through which 
conversion impacts  enterprise performance and the distribution of rewards operate in 
countervailing directions.  Through 2001, it appears that the shareholding experiment has 
reduced layoffs and slowed wage growth.  The longer-term induced effect suggests that 
these impacts may be reversed so as to be consistent with privatization outcomes in other 
countries.  We observe a robust shift in resources toward innovation, but it is premature 
to anticipate the sustainability or measure the impact of these changes.  Finally, the 
distribution impact of the China’s shareholding experiment will ultimately have to be 
viewed within the context of its complementary institutions.  If growth remains robust, 
furloughed workers are more likely to transition successfully to new employment, wages 
will rise throughout the economy, and a managerial class will become absorbed into an 
increasingly broad-based managerial and professional class. 
 
 
  Table 1 
Change in ownership distribution 
of industrial enterprises (%) 
 
Measure  Old accounting  
system
1 
New accounting 
system
2 
Ownership type  1980
3  1985 1994 1997 1998 2001 
State-owned    62,437  69,834  85,334  84,397  64,737  46,767 
Collective-owned 263,378  300,687  342,908  319,438  47,745  31,018 
                                                                                                                                                                             
overall living standards. 40 
H.K, Macao, Taiwan  -  -  16,388  23,020  15,725  18,257 
Foreign  -  -  12,713 19,861 10,717 13,166 
Shareholding   -  -  4,359  3,898  11,411  24,648 
Private  -  -  3,898  13,188 10,667 36,218 
Other  domestic  -  1,522 627 1,356 224  321 
Total  in  the  system  326,160  372,043 465,239 468,506 165,080 171,256 
Total GVIO (billion yuan)  471   839  5,135  6,835  6,774  9,545 
Individual  enterprises  -  - 8,007,400  5,974,700 -  - 
National total   377,066  463,210  10,017,100  7,922,900  7,974,600  - 
Total GVIO (billion yuan)  490  972  7,018   11,373  11,905  - 
 
1 Includes all industrial enterprises that operate as independent accounting units at or above the 
township level.   
2 Includes all state-owned enterprises plus non-state enterprises that report annual sales in excess 
of 5 million yuan.   
3NBS (1998). 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Shares of LMEs in aggregate industry (%) 
 
Measure  Old accounting system
1  New Accounting system
2 
  1994 1997 1998 2001 
Sales
  58.2 57.4 57.9 62.4 
Employment
  43.5 47.4 55.1 51.1 
Assets
  65.5 65.9 69.9 69.2 
# of enterprises  4.4  5.1  14.2  13.4 
 
1 Includes all industrial enterprises that operate as independent accounting units at or  
   above the township level.   
2 Includes all industrial enterprises that report annual sales in excess of 5 million yuan.   
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Table 3 
LME ownership distribution [%] 
 
Ownership type  1994  2001 
State-owned  15,533   [67.9]       8675  [37.9] 
Collective-owned   4,068   [17.8]       2465  [10.8] 
Hong-Kong, Macao, Taiwan       967     [4.2]     2271    [9.9] 
Foreign    1,041     [4.6]     2675  [11.7] 
Shareholding        961     [4.2]     5659  [24.7] 
Private           7     [0.0]       984    [4.3] 
Other domestic       293     [1.3]       149    [0.7] 
Total  22,870 [100.0]  22878 [100.0] 
 
 
  
Table 4a 
Comparison by ownership type only 
(panel, 1996-2001) 
 
Variable VA/L  VA/K  Profit/ 
sales 
Employ-
ment 
Wages 
(average) 
Taxes/ 
sales 
New 
prod/sales 
R&D 
exp/sales 
Constant 
 
0.659 
(45.607) 
0.659 
(45.607) 
-2.369 
(273.692)
7.108 
(776.069)
1.605 
(251.415)
-4.889 
(398.462) 
-13.443 
(174.883) 
-17.427 
(267.528)
K/L   0.459 
(153.335) 
-0.541 
(180.615) 
- - - -  - - 
COE 
 
0.597 
(72.284) 
0.597 
(72.284) 
0.067 
(9.917) 
-0.553 
(75.731) 
0.007 
(1.436) 
0.050 
(5.137) 
-1.845 
(-30.087) 
-1.385 
(26.647) 
FOR 
 
1.102 
(95.535) 
1.102 
(95.535) 
-0.031 
(3.373) 
-0.876 
(90.211) 
0.913 
(134.861)
-0.927 
(68.361) 
-3.245 
(-39.840) 
-2.565 
(37.162) 
GAT 
 
0.901 
(74.334) 
0.901 
(74.334) 
-0.150 
(15.139) 
-0.802 
(76.584) 
0.621 
(85.039) 
-0.972 
(65.816) 
-2.706 
(30.797) 
-1.514 
(20.335) 
OTH 
 
0.455 
(16.632) 
0.455 
(16.632) 
-0.093 
(4.101) 
-0.562 
(23.268) 
0.254 
(15.048) 
-0.155 
(4.838) 
-1.100 
(5.425) 
-1.475 
(8.581) 
PRI 
 
0.846 
(34.663) 
0.846 
(34.663) 
-0.219 
(10.968) 
-0.821 
(37.988) 
0.141 
(9.388) 
0.043 
(1.490) 
-2.739 
(15.104) 
-1.490 
(9.695) 
STK 
 
0.602 
(68.646) 
0.602 
(68.646) 
0.054 
(7.536) 
-0.124 
(16.083) 
0.177 
(32.836) 
0.252 
(24.610) 
0.088 
(1.361) 
0.354 
(6.433) 
IND  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Year    yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Adj. R-sq 
(obs) 
0.375 
(138843) 
0.262 
(138843) 
0.098 
(12.5611)
0.249 
(138843) 
0.231 
(138843) 
0.238 
(133064) 
0.176 
(138843) 
0.088 
(138843) 
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Table 4b 
Comparison by asset composition only 
 
Variable VA/L  VA/K Profit/ 
sales 
Employ-
ment 
Wage 
(average) 
Taxes/ 
sales 
New 
prod/sales 
R&D 
exp/sales 
Constant 
 
1.279 
(60.905) 
1.279 
(60.905) 
-2.273 
(169.920)
7.004 
(481.074)
2.004 
(203.266)
-5.756 
(294.064) 
-13.930 
(116.022) 
-19.551 
(193.317)
K/L   0.574 
(162.856) 
-0.426 
(120.759) 
- - - - - - 
STATE 
asset share 
-0.077 
(68.632) 
-0.077 
(68.632) 
0.006 
(6.540) 
0.070 
(67.315) 
-0.019 
(27.217) 
0.001 
(0.745) 
0.169 
(19.864) 
0.160 
(22.232) 
FOR/HKT 
asset share 
0.088 
(57.535) 
0.088 
(57.535) 
-0.003 
(2.112) 
-0.039 
(29.498) 
0.094 
(104.158)
-0.138 
(75.499) 
-0.194 
(17.638) 
-0.203 
(21.900) 
IND  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
YEAR  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R-sq 
(obs) 
0.379 
96908 
0.283 
96908 
0.101 
87820 
0.231 
96908 
0.244 
96908 
0.226 
92718 
0.170 
96908 
0.093 
96908 
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Table 4c 
Comparison by ownership classification and asset composition 
 
Variable VA/L  VA/K Profit/ 
sales 
Employ-
ment 
Wages 
(average) 
Taxes/ 
sales 
New 
prod/sales
R&D 
exp/sales
Constant 
 
1.086 
(44.507) 
1.086 
(44.508) 
-2.295 
(130.261)
7.697 
(402.711)
1.700 
(130.869)
-5.214 
(203.023) 
-11.257 
(70.368) 
-18.015 
(133.412)
K/L 0.580 
(164.763) 
-0.420 
(119.419)   - 
 
- - - - 
COE 
 
0.308 
(24.005) 
0.308 
(24.005) 
-0.054 
(4.983) 
-0.335 
(28.698) 
-0.175 
(22.016) 
0.110 
(7.030) 
-1.655 
(16.940) 
-0.994 
(12.046) 
FOR 
 
0.563 
(26.914) 
0.563 
(26.914) 
0.118 
(6.741) 
-1.013 
(53.505) 
0.507 
(39.395) 
-0.599 
(23.211) 
-3.958 
(24.988) 
-2.677 
(20.018) 
GAT 
 
0.342 
(16.404) 
0.342 
(16.404) 
-0.038 
(2.161) 
-0.902 
(47.689) 
0.206 
(16.025) 
-0.659 
(25.333) 
-3.333 
(21.047) 
-1.576 
(11.789) 
OTH 
 
0.315 
(9.398) 
0.315 
(9.398) 
-0.065 
(2.297) 
-0.422 
(13.821) 
0.146 
(7.015) 
-0.113 
(2.773) 
-0.838 
(3.282) 
-1.240 
(5.749) 
PRI 
 
0.509 
(19.609) 
0.509 
(19.609) 
-0.108 
(4.942) 
-0.494 
(20.919) 
-0.129 
(8.064) 
0.072 
(2.268) 
-1.901 
(9.630) 
-1.569 
(9.413) 
STK 
 
0.428 
(40.585) 
0.428 
(40.585) 
0.118 
(13.31) 
0.017 
(1.740) 
0.024 
(3.662) 
0.261 
(20.438) 
0.401 
(4.986) 
0.217 
(3.203) 
STATE 
asset share 
-0.046 
(31.394) 
-0.046 
(31.394) 
0.004 
(3.257) 
0.041 
(30.673) 
-0.028 
(30.674) 
0.009 
(4.912) 
0.044 
(3.941) 
0.080 
(8.461) 
FOR/HKT 
asset share 
0.062 
(23.786) 
0.062 
(23.786) 
-0.008 
(-3.571) 
0.062 
(26.563) 
0.041 
(25.782) 
-0.05 
(-15.71) 
0.193 
(9.793) 
0.022 
(1.304) 
IND  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time    yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R-sq 
(obs) 
0.392 
(96908) 
0.298 
(96908) 
0.106 
(87820) 
0.261 
(96908) 
0.268 
(96908) 
0.240 
(92718) 
0.179 
(96908) 
0.099 
(96908) 44 
 
 
Table 5a 
Converted SOEs 
 
Total population of SOE conversions 
Old  New 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
SOE  DSOE  12909 13268 11326  9824  8711  6899  62937 
SOE  DCOE  16 69  145  64 52 52  398 
SOE  DSTK  87  342 546 319 517 454  2265 
SOE  DPRV 1  10 31 14 30 36  122 
SOE  DFOR 11 15 21  5  5  6  63 
SOE  DGAT 3  13 16 14 10 14 70 
SOE  DOTH 5  28 40 23 12 10  118 
TOTAL    13032 13745 12125 10263  9337  7471  3,036 
Conversions for which data are continuously available from 1995-2001 
Old  New 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
SOE DSOE  5343 5235 4964 4887 4697 4425  29551 
SOE  DCOE 5  17 66 26 18 30  162 
SOE  DSTK  31  110 210 110 204 236 901 
SOE  DPRV  0 2 8 5  10  19  44 
SOE  DFOR  2 4 5 3 2 2  18 
SOE  DGAT  0 3 3 6 1 4  17 
SOE  DOTH  2  10  18  4 5 5  44 
TOTAL    5383 5381 5274 5041 4937 4721 1,186 
Conversions for which data are continuously available from 
1995-2001, there is only one conversion, and data are plausible 
Old   New  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total 
 (96-99)
SOE SOE  3484 3413 3225 3170 3107  -  3,569 
SOE  SHR  13  48 128 69 146  -  258 
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Table 5b 
Converted COEs 
 
Total population of COE conversions 
Old  New 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
COE  DSOE 37 45 56 27 12 22  199 
COE DCOE  3109 3526 2566 2698 2539 1716  16154 
COE  DSTK  35  124 211 157 187 256 970 
COE  DPRV 5  8  35 30 73 65  216 
COE  DFOR 8  10 18 10 10 11 67 
COE  DGAT 6  9  41 15 14 12 97 
COE  DOTH  11 12 24  8  4  6  65 
TOTAL    3211 3734 2951 2945 2839 2088 1,614 
Conversions for which data are continuously available from 1995-2001 
Old  New 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
COE  DSOE 9 14  21 9  2 12  67 
COE  DCOE 1053  1008 924  968  938  834 5725 
COE  DSTK 12 44 64 42 49 91  302 
COE  DPRV  1 2 7 9  20  26  65 
COE  DFOR  3 2 5 4 2 4  20 
COE  DGAT  3 1  14  7 3 2  30 
COE  DOTH  2 5 7 6 1 1  22 
TOTAL    1083 1076 1042 1045 1015  970  506 
Conversions for which data are continuously available from 
1995-2001, there is only one conversion, and data are plausible 
Old  New 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total   
COE COE  1053 1002  849  787  723  -  858 
COE SHR  3  20  47  23  -  -  103 
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 Table 6 
Characteristics of converted enterprises in t-1 
(includes conversions for 1996-2000)*  
 
 SOE-STK 
conversions 
COE-STK  
conversions 
(VA/L)t-1  0.004 
(2.916) 
0.005 
(1.230) 
(VA/K)t-1 0.006 
(4.115) 
0.003 
(0.781) 
(Profit/sales)t-1 0.005 
(2.764) 
0.008 
(1.501) 
(Employment) t-1   -0.003 
(1.852) 
0.004 
(0.754) 
Wage t-1   -0.001 
(0.228) 
0.008 
(1.215) 
(Taxes/sales) t-1 0.007 
(5.945) 
0.006 
(1.633) 
(NP/sales) t-1 -0.000 
(0.872) 
0.001 
(2.259) 
(RDE/sales) t-1 -0.000 
(0.591) 
0.001 
(1.096) 
IND yes  yes 
Region   yes  yes 
Year yes  yes 
  
*The estimation results for each variable are drawn from regressions that include  
the single performance measure with control dummies for industry, region, and year. 47 
 Table 7  
Distribution of conversions by industry 
 
SOEs COEs 
Total 
Sample  Converted
Total 
Sample  Converted
Industry Group  # % # % # % # % 
Mining(6-12)  975  7.4 5 2.0  26 0.9  1  1.0 
Food and beverage(13-16)  1362 10.3 28  10.9 123 4.2  2  1.9 
Textile, apparel, and leather products(17-19) 962  7.3  19  7.4  693 23.4  24  23.3
Timber, furniture, and paper (20-24)  766  5.8  19  7.4  177 6.0  5  4.9 
Petroleum processing and coking (25)  140  1.1  3  1.2  14 0.5  1  1.0 
Chemicals (26-28)  1639 12.4 60  23.4 283 9.6  15 14.6
Rubber and plastic (29-30)  322  2.4  8  3.1  252 8.5  5  4.9 
Non-metal mineral products (31)  949  7.2  19  7.4  258 8.7  11 10.7
Metal processing and products (32-34)  505  3.8  7  2.7  226 7.6  5  4.9 
Electric power (44)  832  6.3  2  0.8  6 0.2 0 0.0 
Machinery (35-42)  4285 32.4 84  32.8 802 27.1  33  32.0
Other (43, 45, 46)  506  3.8  2  0.8  96 3.2  1  1.0 
Total 13243 100 256 100 2956 100  103 100
 
 
Table 8 
Regional distribution and selection 
 
 
  North  
(D1) 
Northeast  
(D2) 
East 
(D3) 
South 
(D4)  
Southwest 
(D5) 
Northwest 
(D6) 
SOEs 0.0468 
(1.428) 
- 0.853 
(2.896) 
0.896 
(2.964) 
0.359 
(0.942) 
0.180 
(0.413) 
Total # of firms  2200  1336  4968  3191  1081  774 
Sample of converted  34  13  112  75  15  9 
%  converted 1.5 1.0 2.3 2.4 1.4 1.2     
COEs 
 
0.658 
(1.032) 
0.839 
(1.237) 
1.300 
(2.810) 
- n.a.  n.a. 
Total # of firms  225  151  2150  316  98  16 
Sample of converted  5  4  89  5  0  0 
%  converted 2.2 2.6 4.1 1.6  0  0 48 
Table 9a 
All SOE conversions (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) 
lnZ2001 
 
Independent  
Variable (Z2001) 
VA/ 
LABOR 
VA/ 
CAPITAL 
PROFIT/ 
SALES 
EMPLOY-
MENT 
WAGES 
(average) 
TAXES/ 
SALES 
NP/ 
SALES 
RDE/ 
SALES 
Constant 
 
1.512 
(53.863) 
-0.394 
(20.430) 
-1.192 
(46.845) 
0.094 
(3.110) 
0.927 
(46.760) 
-1.594 
(37.472) 
-7.639 
(44.201) 
-9.271 
(43.165) 
STKdummy 
 
0.020 
(0.344) 
0.146 
(2.224) 
-0.124 
(2.174) 
0.073 
(2.274) 
-0.095 
(2.456) 
-0.050 
(0.709) 
1.476 
(2.432) 
1.262 
(2.155) 
∆ in share state assets, 
t-1 to 01 
-0.039 
(7.179) 
-0.023 
(3.923) 
-0.003 
(0.487) 
0.011 
(3.912) 
-0.035 
(10.070) 
0.015 
(2.319) 
-0.200 
(4.125) 
-0.099 
(2.117) 
∆ in share state assets, 
t-1  to  01  *STK  - - - - - - 
0.603 
(2.092) 
0.454 
(1.634) 
Dummy for “increase” 
in state asset share 
0.049 
(1.632) 
0.001 
(0.305) 
-0.051 
(1.741) 
-0.010 
(0.629) 
-0.002 
(0.093) 
-0.033 
(0.935) 
0.133 
(0.502) 
0.194 
(0.762) 
lnZt-1 
 
0.497 
(54.591) 
0.579 
(57.697) 
0.500 
(43.423) 
0.944 
(234.471) 
0.637 
(65.329) 
0.632 
(71.601) 
0.506 
(62.506) 
0.308 
(31.518) 
1997 
-0.033 
(1.488) 
-0.164 
(6.716) 
0.040 
(1.851) 
0.008 
(0.679) 
-0.039 
(2.732) 
0.029 
(1.103) 
0.174 
(0.885) 
-0.520 
(2.737) 
1998 
-0.058 
(2.584) 
-0.238 
(9.582) 
0.060 
(2.709) 
0.010 
(0.800) 
-0.048 
(3.312) 
0.042 
(1.568) 
0.483 
(2.431) 
-0.557 
(2.894) 
1999 
-0.065 
(2.877) 
-0.221 
(8.747) 
0.125 
(5.607) 
0.078 
(6.418) 
-0.065 
(4.421) 
0.026 
(0.980) 
0.374 
(1.870) 
-0.667 
(3.440) 
Adj R-sq (obs) 
0.226 
(10,758) 
0.263 
(10,758) 
0.171 
(9,232) 
0.837 
(10.758) 
0.298 
(10,722) 
0.329 
(10,497) 
0.273 
(10,758) 
0.087 
(10,758) 
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Table 9b 
All COE conversions (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) 
lnZ2001 
 
Independent  
Variable (Z2001) 
VA/ 
LABOR 
VA/ 
CAPITAL
PROFIT/ 
SALES 
EMPLOY
-MENT 
WAGES 
(average) 
TAXES/ 
SALES 
NP/ 
SALES 
RDE/ 
SALES 
Constant 
 
1.214 
(17.222) 
-0.092 
(2.586) 
-1.152 
(20.224) 
-0.043 
(0.475) 
1.053 
(28.902) 
-2.490 
(24.697) 
-8.983 
(23.453) 
-11.492 
(25.574) 
STKdummy 
 
0.130 
(1.554) 
0.266 
(2.809) 
0.136 
(1.788) 
0.152 
(3.071)) 
0.044 
(0.935) 
0.098) 
(0.931) 
2.084 
(2.645) 
0.083 
(0.122) 
increase in share state 
assets, t-1 to 01 
-0.014 
(0.859) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
-0.024 
(1.550) 
0.004 
(0.427 
0.009 
(1.013) 
0.003 
(0.155) 
0.235 
(1.553) 
-0.101 
(0.775) 
Dummy for “increase” 
in state asset share 
0.087 
(0.861) 
0.047 
(0.411) 
0.143 
(1.443) 
-0.055 
(0.911) 
-0.030 
(0.522) 
0.216 
(1.638) 
-0.458 
(0.481) 
0.469 
(0.571) 
lnZt-1 
 
0.688 
(35.679) 
0.754 
(33.587) 
0.607 
(24.625) 
0.967 
(71.573) 
0.555 
(30.434) 
0.445 
(21.444) 
0.397 
(20.672) 
0.268 
(12.226) 
1998 
0.005 
(0.127) 
-0.025 
(0.517) 
0.014 
(0.348) 
-0.009 
(0.363) 
-0.037 
(1.521) 
0.030 
(0.548) 
0.044 
(0.110) 
-0.112 
(0.322) 
1999 
0.017 
(0.389) 
0.018 
(0.369) 
0.122 
(3.013) 
0.058 
(2.277) 
-0.021 
(0.850) 
0.012 
(0.217) 
0.129 
(0.321) 
0.118 
(0.337) 
Adj R-sq (obs) 
0.369 
(2,184) 
0.346 
(2,184) 
0.235 
(2,003) 
0.705 
(2,184) 
0.303 
(2,168) 
0.180 
(2,121) 
0.169 
(2,184) 
0.065 
(2,184) 50 
Table 10 
Summary of selection bias conversion results 
Ranked in terms of statistical significance 
(all are statistically significant at ≥ 90% level) 
 
Variable change   sign  SOEs  COEs 
+ VA/L* 
VA/K*  
Profit/sales* 
Tax/sales* 
-  Selection bias 
(baseline perform-
ance relative to 
unconverted firms) 
(see Table 6)  - Employment*** 
 
- 
+ VA/labor*   
VA/capital* 
Employment** 
RDE/sales** 
NP/sales** 
VA/capital* 
Profit/sales*** 
Employment* 
NP/sales* 
Direct conversion 
effect (assuming no 
change in asset 
structure) 
 
- Avg.  wage** 
Profit/sales* 
- 
+ VA/labor* 
VA/capital* 
Wages*  
NP/sales? 
RDE/sales? 
-  Effect of an decrease 
in state-owned asset 
share  
- Employment* 
Taxes/sales** 
- 
+ -  -  Dummy for an 
increase in state-
owned asset share 
- Profit/sales***  - 
 
*statistically significant at the 1% level 
**statistically significant at the 5% level 
***statistically significant at the 10% level. 
? The effect consists of two estimated coefficients.  
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Table 11 
Change in state asset share (i.e. ∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01) in  
converted enterprises relative to unconverted enterprises  
 
variable SOE-SHR 
conversions 
COE-SHR 
conversions 
Constant -0.017 
(15.579) 
-0.075 
(2.255) 
DSTK -0.078 
(9.209) 
-0.052 
(0.317) 
Adj. R-sq 
(obs) 
0.008 
(3,851) 
0.000 
(961) 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Reduction in state asset share, t-1 to 2001 
 
∆lnST_SHt-1 to 01  Unconverted   Firms converted to SHRs 
 t-1  2001  Ratio 
2001/t-1 
t-1 2001  Ratio 
2001/t-1 
SOEs  91.6  72.5 0.792 78.1  40.6 0.520 
COEs  7.3  3.2 0.438 9.1  2.1 0.231 
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Table 13 
Comparison of rates of growth and levels: converted and non-converted 
 
 
VA/ 
LABOR 
VA/ 
CAPITAL
PROFIT/ 
SALES 
EMPLOY 
-MENT 
AVG. 
WAGE 
TAX/ 
SALES 
NP/ 
SALES 
RDE/ 
SALES 
SOE-converted vs. non-converted 
Actual growth rates, t-1 to 2001 
converted  0.026  -0.028 -0.092  -0.054  0.047 -0.036 0.021  0.377 
non-converted  0.042 -0.025  -0.050  -0.067  0.058  0.007  -0.264 0.202 
Estimated rates of growth resulting 
from conversion  0.012*  0.041* -0.032*  0.020*  -0.020* 0.007* -0.268*  0.197* 
COE-converted vs. non-converted 
Actual growth rates, t-1 to 2001 
converted 0.054  0.032  -0.037  -0.021  0.049  0.007  -0.217  0.081 
non-converted 0.043  -0.022  -0.071  -0.065  0.053  0.001  -0.278  0.153 
Estimated rates of growth resulting 
from conversion  0.033 0.067*  0.035*  0.035*  0.011  0.025  0.511* 0.025 
 
*At least one of the coefficients relevant to the total conversion impact is statistically significant at the 10% level or greater.53 
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Annex 1 
Concordance of Ownership Classifications, 1994-1999 
 
1994 1999 
 Code  Ownership category  Code  Ownership category 
State-owned 
11 State-owned  enterprises  110 State-owned  enterprises 
12  State owned jointly operated enterprises  141  State owned jointly operated enterprises 
11  Wholly state-owned companies  151  Wholly state-owned companies 
Collective-owned 
21 Collective-owned  enterprises  120 Collective-owned  enterprises 
   130  Shareholding  cooperatives 
22  Collective jointly operated enterprises  142  Collective jointly operated enterprises 
Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan-owned 
81  Overseas joint ventures  210  Overseas joint ventures 
82  Overseas cooperatives  220  Overseas cooperatives 
83  Overseas wholly-owned enterprises  230  Overseas wholly-owned enterprises 
    240  Overseas shareholding limited companies 
Foreign-owned 
71  Foreign joint ventures  310  Foreign joint ventures 
72  Foreign cooperatives  320  Foreign cooperatives 
73  Foreign wholly-owned enterprises   330  Foreign wholly-owned enterprises  
    340  Foreign shareholding limited companies 
Shareholding  
62  Limited liability company  159  Other limited liability companies 
61  Shareholding limited companies  160  Shareholding limited companies 
Private  
31  Private wholly-owned enterprises  171  Private wholly-owned enterprises 
32  Private cooperative enterprises  172  Private cooperative enterprises 
33  Private limited liability companies  173  Private limited liability companies 
    174  Private shareholding companies 
Other domestic 
51  State-collective jointly operated enterprises  143  State-collective jointly operated enterprises
    149  Other jointly operated enterprises  
52  State-private jointly operated enterprises     
53  Collective-private jointly operated enter.     
54  State-collective-private jointly operated enter.     
9  Other enterprises  190  Other enterprises 
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